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I. INTRODUCTIONTHE Survey period was a turbulent time for professional liability
actions of all types, featuring disagreements and inconsistencies
among the various courts of appeals concerning the requirements
of a certificate of merit in suits against architects and engineers, piercing
the corporate veil in cases against officers and directors, and the test for
determining liability for "shareholder oppression." The Texas Supreme
Court also issued important decisions affecting the timing of filing expert
reports in medical malpractice cases and expanding the protections of the
health care liability statute into unexpected areas. The United States Su-
preme Court even weighed in, clarifying the scope of federal jurisdiction
over legal malpractice claims and overruling a prior decision of the Texas
Supreme Court.
II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
During the Survey period, Texas courts struggled with whether and to
what extent malpractice claims arising out of the litigation of federal
claims may be tried in Texas state courts before the United States Su-
preme Court ended the debate. First, in Minton v. Gunn, the Texas Su-
preme Court reversed the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and held that
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over state-law legal malpractice
claims that require the application of federal patent law.1 The defendant
in In re Haynes and Boone, LLP then tried, unsuccessfully, to expand
that holding to a case involving alleged malpractice in connection with
federal antitrust litigation.2 But even as the boundaries of the Minton v.
Gunn decision were being tested at the state court level, the United
States Supreme Court reversed Minton and settled the issue.3
Minton v. Gunn involved alleged negligence during the litigation of a
patent infringement case in federal court.4 The plaintiff alleged that, in
the underlying patent case, the defendant lawyers failed to timely plead
and pursue the "experimental use doctrine" and that, as a result, the
plaintiff's patent infringement case was dismissed on summary judgment.
In the subsequent malpractice action, the attorney defendants won sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the experimental
use doctrine was not applicable and, therefore, their failure to plead and
pursue it did not result in any harm to the plaintiff.5
1. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 647 (Tex. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Gunn v. Minton,
No. 11-1118, 2013 WL 610193 (U.S. 2013).
2. In re Haynes and Boone, LLP, 376 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
3. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
4. Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 637-38.
5. Id. at 638.
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On appeal, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the state
courts did not have jurisdiction over his claim. He relied on two Federal
Circuit cases, Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld, LLP 6 and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski,
LLP,7 which seemed to support dismissal. But the state appellate court
declined to follow the Federal Circuit precedent, denied plaintiff's motion
to dismiss, and affirmed the summary judgment.8
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 9 It held that the proper application
of the experimental use doctrine would play "a substantial role" in the
legal malpractice case because the plaintiff would have to prove that the
assertion of the experimental use doctrine would have changed the out-
come of the federal patent litigation.10 The supreme court wrote that
when "the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a neces-
sary element of one of the well-pleaded claims," the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction." It therefore reversed the court of appeals and dis-
missed the case.12
While Minton was on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, an-
other Texas court considered a similar issue. In In re Haynes and Boone,
LLP, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant lawyers were negligent in
the handling of a federal antitrust claim, which had been filed in federal
court and was dismissed on limitations grounds. 13 The plaintiffs filed their
malpractice claim in state court, and the defendants moved to dismiss on
the grounds that Texas state courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to ad-
judicate malpractice claims containing embedded federal questions. De-
fendants argued that because plaintiffs would have to prove their "case
within the case"-i.e., that they would have prevailed on the federal
Sherman Act claim but for the alleged negligence of the defendants-the
claim arose under the federal antitrust laws and was, therefore, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The defendants argued that
resolving the claims would "entail litigation of the full panoply of factual
and legal issues attending to a Sherman Act claim."1 4 They relied on Min-
ton, as well as another recent case out of the Fifth Circuit holding that
malpractice claims "arising under" federal patent law invoke the exclu-
sive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and thus cannot be
brought in state court-USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp.15
6. Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 F.3d
1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
7. Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
8. Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 639.
9. Id. at 647.
10. Id. at 639.
11. Id. at 640 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809
(1988)).
12. Id. at 647.
13. In re Haynes and Boone, LLP, 376 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
14. Id. at 843.
15. USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 277-82 (5th Cir. 2011).
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But the Houston Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that malpractice
claims arising under federal antitrust laws should be treated differently
than those arising under federal patent laws. 16 Federal courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction over any claims related to patents and, in addition, "[njo
State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . ."17 The court in USPPS
therefore, applied the standards set out in Grable & Sons Metal Products
to determine whether the malpractice claims in those cases "arose under"
the federal patent laws and whether they were, therefore, subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The state of the law on this issue was not in flux for long, however, as
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Minton v. Gunn
and held that "state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent
matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law" for the pur-
pose of invoking federal jurisdiction.' 8 The Court acknowledged that
"resolution of a federal patent question is 'necessary;' to Minton's case,"
and was "actually disputed" because Minton would have to refer to fed-
eral patent law to establish his case within a case.19 But the Court found
that the federal issue was not "substantial." It noted that the Texas Su-
preme Court erred by considering the issue's importance to Minton's case
rather than its importance to federal patent law. Looking at the issue
from this point, the Court noted that the patent issues in a legal malprac-
tice case will generally be backward looking; i.e., what would have hap-
pened had the case gone differently? The resolution of such hypothetical
questions will not be precedential and should have no effect on the devel-
opment of federal law and, therefore, are not "significant to the federal
system as a whole" as is required to establish federal jurisdiction.20
Although the Court was careful not to say that no legal malpractice
case turning on an issue of federal law could ever invoke federal jurisdic-
tion, under the reasoning set out by the Court, it is difficult to imagine
many cases that would fall outside of the Minton ruling.
B. THE PERILS OF THE UNWORTHY CLIENT
An increasing source of high-risk malpractice claims is a law firm's as-
sociation with a client that turns out to be involved in fraudulent activity.
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas tackled one such
case during the Survey period-Reneker v. Offill.21 This case was filed by
a court-appointed special receiver on behalf of three related companies
(referred to as the "AmerFirst Clients") that had been in the business of
selling Collateral Secured Debt Obligation Notes (CSDOs) to the public.
16. In re Haynes and Boone, 376 S.W.3d at 845-46.
17. Id. at 845 n.12 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006)).
18. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
19. Id. at 1065-66.
20. Id. at 1068.




As it turns out, in selling the CSDOs, the AmerFirst Clients had violated
various federal and state securities laws. The special receiver filed suit
against the AmeriFirst Clients' lawyers, Phillip Offill and Godwin Pappas
Langley Ronquillo, LLP (referred to collectively as "Godwin Pappas"),
alleging they had failed to "properly advise and assist the AmeriFirst Cli-
ents in offering securities for sale to the public." 22
In ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
held that the receiver only had standing to sue for injuries to the Amer-
iFirst Clients themselves, and not for injuries to creditors or investors.23
This limited the recoverable damages to the professional fees incurred by
the AmeriFirst Clients as a result of the receivership. 24 The court there-
fore granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to all other
categories of damages, including increased liability to investors.25
The court also considered various defenses asserted by Godwin Pappas
based on the fact that two of the AmeriFirst Clients' principals were in-
volved in the alleged fraudulent activity such that their knowledge should
be imputed to the AmeriFirst Clients and the claims against Godwin Pap-
pas should be barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto.26 Despite persua-
sive evidence that both principals had knowingly violated the securities
laws, the court seemed to go out of its way to avoid penalizing the Amer-
iFirst Clients in the malpractice action. The court held that, even assum-
ing Godwin Pappas had adequately proved that the principals had
"knowingly and willfully engaged in unlawful acts" and that they were in
pari delicto with Godwin Pappas, "it does not follow that the AmerFirst
Clients are as well, because a corporation is a distinct entity separate
from its stockholders, officers and directors."27 The court went on to hold
that "[t]he distinction between a corporation and its officers or agents is
reinforced by the appointment of a receiver, who acts on behalf of the
corporation as a whole."28 It concluded that "applying in pari delicto
would undermine a receivership if it were to bar a suit on behalf of [a
corporation] to recover funds for defrauded investors and other innocent
victims." 29 It therefore denied summary judgment on this ground.30
This ruling seems inconsistent with the theory that a receiver steps into
the shoes of the entity over which he has been appointed receiver and
should have no greater rights than that entity otherwise would have, as
well as the court's earlier ruling that the receiver could recover only for
damages to the company itself and not for injuries to creditors and inves-
tors.31 But this case presents a cautionary tale of how courts sometimes
22. Id. at *4.
23. Id. at *22-23.
24. Id. at *14-15, *30.
25. Id. at *22-23.
26. Id. at *90-91.
27. Id. at *92 (internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at *93 (internal quotations omitted).
29. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
30. Id. at *94.
31. See id. at *5, *15 n.15.
10592013]1
SMU LAW REVIEW
step in and hold lawyers accountable when clients go bad.
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DUTY
To READ WHAT YOU SIGN
In Camp Mystic, Inc. v. Eastland, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that a client has no duty to read documents before signing them.32
The lawyer at issue in this case, Stacy Eastland, was a part-owner in a
family-owned business called Camp Mystic. In order to protect the family
from potential liabilities arising out of operation of the camp, Stacy advo-
cated and ultimately structured a reorganization of the business, separat-
ing the business into two corporations, referred to as "NFP" and "New
CM," where NFP owned the real estate and leased it to New CM, which
was responsible for camp operations. Stacy was a shareholder in NFP, but
not New CM. The business operated smoothly for almost ten years after
the reorganization, but then disputes arose as to the proper construction
of the lease Stacy had drafted. Stacy's brother, Dick Eastland, alleged on
behalf of himself and New CM that Stacy wrongfully failed to disclose or
obtain a waiver of the conflict created by Stacy representing all of the
parties to the transaction and that the lease terms were not what Stacy
represented them to be.33
Stacy argued that any claims were barred by limitations because the
cause of action accrued when the parties executed the lease agreement
more than ten years earlier.34 "[A] cause of action accrues when a wrong-
ful act causes a legal injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of that
injury or if all resulting damages have yet to occur."35 But legal malprac-
tice cases are subject to the discovery rule, which tolls limitations until the
plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the nature of his injury.36 The discovery rule is based on the
idea that "[i]t is unrealistic to expect a layman client to have sufficient
legal acumen to perceive an injury at the time of the negligent act or
omission of his attorney." 37
Stacy argued that, had Dick only read the lease provisions at issue, he
would have known what the leases provided, and so the discovery rule
should not apply. The appellate court disagreed and held that "New CM
and Dick had no duty to read the Lease and could rely on Stacy's alleged
misrepresentation." 38 The court relied on another recent case, West v.
Proctor,39 which similarly held that "it was reasonable for [the] property
32. Camp Mystic, Inc. v. Eastland, 390 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2012), pet. granted and judgment vacated by agr., 2013 Tex. LEXIS 26 (Tex. Jan. 11, 2013).
33. Id. at 449-50.
34. Id. at 463.
35. Id. at 452 (quoting Provident Life & Accidental Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,
221 (Tex. 2003)).
36. Id. at 453.
37. Id. (quoting Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988)).
38. Id. at 454.
39. West v. Proctor, 353 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2011, pet. denied).
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owner to trust that her fiduciary negotiated the lease in accordance with
the terms that she had agreed to and that property owner was under no
duty to read the lease prior to signing it." 4 0
It is not unusual for courts to give clients the benefit of the doubt and
to permit them to rely on their lawyer's advice without second-guessing
it. And to the extent the legal import of the leases was not apparent to a
lay person, which the court found with regard to some of the language at
issue in Camp Mystic, application of the discovery rule would make sense.
But to the extent the language in the agreements was clear, these cases
seem to go against the general proposition in Texas that a party is charged
with knowledge of the documents he signs.41 It seems that, "in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence," the clients here would have read the leases
and discovered their injury. It remains to be seen whether other Texas
courts will follow Camp Mystic and West by letting clients off the hook
for failing to read the documents they sign.
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. THAT'S A "HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIM"?-THE TEXAS
SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN
During the Survey period, Texas courts continued to wrestle with the
parameters of a "Health Care Liability Claim" (HCLC) and to sort out
what types of cases are subject to the strict requirements of Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74.42 Chapter 74 requires a claim-
ant to serve an expert report within 120 days of filing a HCLC or risk
dismissal of the case with prejudice, along with payment of the defen-
dant's attorney fees. 43 During the most recent Survey period, the Texas
Supreme Court issued two opinions construing the definition of a HCLC,
extending the reach of Chapter 74 to an employment case and a sexual
assault case.
In the first case, Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williams, the Texas
Supreme Court held that an employee's claim for injuries arising out of
inadequate training, supervision, and safety in a mental health facility
qualified as a HCLC.44 Frederick Williams was a psychiatric technician at
Texas West Oak Hospital (West Oak), a mental health hospital in Hous-
ton, Texas. Part of his job was to supervise Mario Vidaurre, a patient with
paranoid schizophrenia, manic outbursts, and violent behavior. One day
Vidaurre became agitated and a physical altercation between Vidaurre
and Williams ensued, resulting in Viduarre's death and injuries to
Williams.45
40. Camp Mystic, 390 S.W.3d at 454.
41. See, e.g., Eller v. NationsBank of Tex., N.A., 975 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App.
Amarillo 1998, no pet.).
42. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.001-507 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
43. Id. at § 74.351(a)-(b).
44. Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. 2012).
45. Id. at 175.
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In the lawsuit by Vidaurre's estate against West Oak and Williams, Wil-
liams asserted cross-claims of negligence against his employer for, among
other things, failing to properly train him and to warn him of the dangers
of working with psychotic patients; providing inadequate supervision and
safety protocols; and failing to provide a safe workplace. West Oak filed a
motion to dismiss, asserting that Williams's claim was an HCLC and that
he had not filed his expert report as required under Chapter 74. The trial
court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that
the employer-employee relationship was the source of the duty and that
the safety claims were not "directly related to health care" as required by
the statute.46 The Texas Supreme Court granted review.
The supreme court first addressed whether Williams's status as a hospi-
tal employee, rather than a patient, prevented his claim from qualifying
as an HCLC.4 7 The supreme court looked to the definition of "health
care liability claim":
[A] cause of action against a health care provider or physician for
treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from ac-
cepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or profes-
sional or administrative services directly related to health care, which
proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the
claimant's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract. 48
In 2003, the legislature changed the word "patient" to "claimant"
within the definition, and the supreme court concluded that the legisla-
ture therefore intended to broaden the definition of HCLC to include
claimants who were not patients. 49 The focus, said the court, "is not the
status of the claimant, but the gravamen of the claim."50
The supreme court held that Williams's claim was an HCLC because he
alleged a departure from accepted standards of "health care."51 Health
care is defined as "any act or treatment performed or furnished . . . by
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the pa-
tient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." 5 2 Although this defini-
tion of "health care" suggests that claims relying on this prong must
involve a patient-physician relationship, the supreme court clarified that
the statute only requires a "nexus between the standard departed from
and the alleged injury." 53 In this case, a nexus arose because Williams was
assaulted by a patient while acting on a physician's orders to provide one-
on-one supervision. 54 Williams's claims centered on the physician's pro-
fessional judgment regarding the safety protocols for care of schizo-
46. Id. at 176.
47. Id. at 178-79.
48. TEX. Civ. PRuc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012).
49. Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., 371 S.W.3d at 178.
50. Id. (citing Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Tex.
2005)).
51. Id. at 181.
52. TEX. Civ. PRnc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(10) (emphasis added).




phrenic patients.5 5 The court referred to the decision in Diversicare
General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio and noted that training and staffing poli-
cies, as well as the protection of patients, "are integral components of
[the facility's] rendition of health care services." 56 Therefore, Williams's
claims fell within the "health care" portion of the HCLC definition.5 7
According to the supreme court, Williams also alleged a "departure
from accepted standards of safety."58 Williams's claims were largely
based on the monitoring and restraint of violent patients, which clearly
involved safety issues. However, a question arose as to whether safety
claims had to be "directly related to health care." The court concluded
that the "directly related to" language in the "health care liability claim"
definition only applies to claims for departures from accepted standards
of professional or administrative services.59 In contrast, "safety" claims
do not need to be directly related to the provision of health care ser-
vices.60 Thus, Williams's monitoring and restraint claims also fell within
the purview of Chapter 74.61
The supreme court also held that a claim is covered by Chapter 74
when "expert medical or health care testimony is necessary to prove or
refute the merits of the claim against a physician or health care pro-
vider." 62 Here, expert evidence was required on the proper training, su-
pervision, and protocols necessary to address aggressive behavior by
patients in mental hospitals. Accordingly, Williams's claims were subject
to Chapter 74.63 Williams failed to provide an expert report as required
by the statute, so the supreme court remanded with orders to dismiss all
claims against the hospital.64
The Texas Supreme Court further clarified the parameters of a "health
care liability claim" in Loaisiga v. Cerda.65 Two female patients alleged
Dr. Loaisiga assaulted them by groping their breasts during examinations
for sinus and flu symptoms. Although the plaintiffs sued for assault, out
of an "abundance of caution" they served Dr. Loaisiga and his profes-
sional association with an expert report as required by § 74.351.66 The
defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the expert report was
deficient, but the trial court denied the motion.67 The court of appeals
affirmed, reasoning that an expert report was not required because the
55. Id.
56. Id. (quoting Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 850 (Tex.
2005)).
57. Id. at 181.
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id. at 185.
60. Id. at 185-86.
61. Id. at 186.
62. Id. at 182.
63. Id. at 192-93.
64. Id. at 193.
65. Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012).
66. Id. at 253.




claims were for assault, not for improper or substandard health care.68
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed. It reiterated that courts must fo-
cus "on the facts underlying the claim, not the form of, or artfully-
phrased language in, the plaintiff's pleadings describing the facts or legal
theories asserted." 69 The court explained that a claim is considered an
HCLC regardless of the cause of action asserted if the facts could support
recovery under the statute.70 Furthermore, a rebuttable presumption that
a claim is an HCLC arises if, as in this case, the cause of action is "against
a physician or health care provider and is based on facts implicating the
defendant's conduct during the course of a patient's care, treatment, or
confinement."7 1 The presumption can be rebutted if the only relationship
between the offending conduct and the medical services provided is the
health care setting or the defendant's status as a health care provider. 72
The supreme court explained that it is often difficult to distinguish such
assault claims from HCLCs, because medical exams often involve the
doctor touching the patient in places or ways that would qualify as assault
if not for the patient's consent in the medical context.73 A court has to
determine whether the alleged touching is within the scope of the treat-
ment or whether it is wholly inconsistent with the rendition of medical
services such that it cannot fall within the definition of an HCLC.74 In an
effort to create a test for making this determination, the Texas Supreme
Court held:
a claim against a medical or health care provider for assault is not an
HCLC if the record conclusively shows that (1) there is no complaint
about any act of the provider related to medical or health care ser-
vices other than the alleged offensive contact, (2) the alleged offen-
sive contact was not pursuant to actual or implied consent by the
plaintiff, and (3) the only possible relationship between the alleged
offensive contact and the rendition of medical services or healthcare
was the setting in which the act took place.75
The plaintiffs here argued that Dr. Loaisiga's actions were so inconsis-
tent with his rendition of medical services that Chapter 74 did not apply.
But the justices examined the entire record and concluded that the pre-
sumption in this case could not be rebutted.76 The court examined the
plaintiffs' pleadings and expert report to determine whether Dr.
Loaisiga's actions could have been reasonable under the circumstances
and concluded that the plaintiffs had not rebutted the presumption that
68. Id.
69. Id. at 255.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 256.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 256-57.
75. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 259. Although a court is limited to the four corners of the expert report when
determining the report's adequacy, it should examine the entire court record to determine
whether the claim is a HCLC subject to the expert report requirement. Id. at 258.
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their claims were HCLCs.77 Because the supreme court clarified the stan-
dard for HCLCs in this case, it remanded the case for further presenta-
tion of evidence.78
As these two cases indicate, the Texas Supreme Court continues to de-
fine the limits of Chapter 74 and to create guidelines for the lower courts
to use in application, and it is willing to extend the protections of Chapter
74 to categories of cases that one might not expect. As Justice Hecht
noted in Loaisiga v. Cerda, if a claimant has any uncertainty as to the
nature of his claim, he would be well served to produce an expert report
out of caution and then argue that his claim is not subject to Chapter 74's
requirements.79
B. TIMING Is EVERYTHING-DOES A NONSUIT TOLL THE 120-DAY
EXPERT REPORT DEADLINE?
During the Survey period, a conflict arose between the Austin and
Houston Courts of Appeals on the crucial issue of timely serving an ex-
pert report. The courts reached different conclusions on whether the 120-
day deadline to serve an expert report is tolled when the plaintiff nonsuits
the case prior to the deadline's expiration. The Texas Supreme Court
granted a petition for review in one of the cases, which will be briefed and
argued over the next Survey period.80
The first case came out of the Austin Court of Appeals. In Estate of
Allen v. Scott & White Clinic, Richard Allen's estate filed suit claiming
that various negligent acts by Scott & White caused Allen's death.81 The
estate voluntarily nonsuited the case 118 days after filing. Four months
later, the plaintiff re-filed the suit and attached an expert report for the
first time. The hospital filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 120-day
deadline to serve a report had passed. The trial court agreed and issued
an order dismissing the suit.8 2
On appeal, the estate argued its report was timely because, at the time
it nonsuited the first case, two days remained before the deadline expired
and so the deadline was tolled until the second case was filed. The court
looked to the statutory language, legislative intent, and other circum-
stances in which courts dealt with tolling under § 74.351 and concluded
nothing in § 74.351 authorizes tolling the 120-day deadline.83 The court
found the absence of a tolling provision significant in contrast to other
portions of the statute where the legislature expressly authorized toll-
77. Id. at 259-60.
78. Id. at 260.
79. Id. at 265 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The claimants in
this case proceeded exactly as they should have. Insisting that their claims are not HCLCs
but claims of assault, they nevertheless produced an expert report.").
80. CHCA Woman's Hosp. L.P. v. Lidji, 369 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012), aff'd 403 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2013).
81. Estate of Allen v. Scott & White Clinic, No. 03-08-00576-CV, 2011 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5674, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin July 22, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
82. Id. at *4-5.
83. Id. at *12-16.
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ing.8 4 Justice Henson concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that
tolling should apply because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 gives a
plaintiff the "absolute right" to nonsuit and that a prohibition on tolling
would infringe on that absolute right.85
Like Justice Henson, the Houston First District Court of Appeals con-
cluded that tolling applies under § 74.351 when a plaintiff voluntarily
nonsuits the case. In CHCA Woman's Hospital v. Lidji, Lidji filed suit as
next friend for his daughter alleging medical malpractice in connection
with her birth.86 Lidji nonsuited the claims 116 days after filing the origi-
nal petition, but before serving an expert report. Two years later, he filed
a new lawsuit and simultaneously served the hospital with an expert re-
port. CHCA moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing the expert
report was untimely because the deadline expired 120 days after Lidji
first filed his original petition, regardless of whether the lawsuit was
pending at the time. Lidji argued that his nonsuit tolled the deadline until
he re-filed suit because the time period could only run when a lawsuit was
actively pending.87
Much like the Austin Court of Appeals, the Houston Court of Appeals
in CHCA Woman's Hospital, L.P. v. Lidji resorted to rules of statutory
interpretation, but it reached the opposite conclusion, causing in a split in
authority amongst the Texas Courts of Appeals.88 The Texas Supreme
Court granted review to resolve the issue.89
The Texas Supreme Court pointed out that § 74.351 neither expressly
allows for tolling nor addresses what effect a nonsuit has on the deadline
and, instead resolved the question by focusing on a plaintiff's absolute
right to file a nonsuit and the legislative intent behind the Texas Medical
Liability Act's (TMLA) expert-report requirement. The supreme court
first looked to the TMLA's purpose of "'reducing excessive frequency
and severity of health care liability claims' and 'decreasing the cost of
those claims,' but doing so' in a manner that will not unduly restrict a
claimant's right."' 90 Based on this legislative intent, the court held that
tolling the expert-report period protects the claimant's absolute right to
nonsuit and is consistent with the statute's structure. 91 Tolling furthers the
statute's purpose by encouraging plaintiffs to nonsuit claims that lack
84. Id. at *13.
85. Id. at *22 (Henson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Henson
would have allowed for tolling, but she concurred with the judgment that the plaintiffs had
not timely served their expert report. Section 74.351 requires the expert report to be served
on the defendant within the 120-day deadline. The Estate arranged for service the day it re-
filed suit, but service was not effective until four days later, two days past the deadline. Id.
at *22, *26-27.
86. CHCA Woman's Hosp. v. Lidji, 369 S.W.3d 488, 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012), aff'd, 403 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2013).
87. Id. at 440-91.
88. Id. at 491.
89. CHCA Woman's Hospital, L.P. v. Lidji, 403 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2013).
90. Id. at 232 (quoting Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.11(b)(1)-(3),
2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884).
91. Id. at 233.
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merit until further investigation into the claim can be done, while simulta-
neously saving defendants the costs of defending the suit until it is later-
filed. The court also noted that requiring the claimant to serve an expert
report in the absence of a pending lawsuit would result in a "host of pro-
cedural complications" the Legislature did not intend.92
Ultimately, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the Houston Court
of Appeals and held that a claimant's nonsuit prior to the expiration of
the 120-day period for serving expert reports tolls the running of that
time period until the claimant re-files his claim, at which point the claim-
ant has the time remaining from the 120-day period to serve the defen-
dant with the report. 93
The court looked to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, which gives the
plaintiff an absolute right to file a nonsuit. 94 The court concluded that
prohibiting tolling in the present situation "would essentially limit a
claimant's ability to nonsuit and re-file his claims to the first 120 days
following the filing of his original petition." 95 Furthermore, allowing the
120-day period to expire when there is no pending health care liability
claim would be an absurd result.9 6 The court ultimately held that a claim-
ant's nonsuit prior to the expiration of the 120-day period for serving
expert reports tolls the running of that time period until the claimant re-
files his claim, at which point the claimant has the time remaining in the
120-day period to serve the defendant with the report. 97
IV. CLAIMS AGAINST ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS
A. THE MERITS OF CERTIFICATES OF MERIT
As with the medical malpractice cases, the appellate courts devoted
most of their writing on claims against architects and engineers to the
requirements of preliminary expert reports, referred to in this context as
"certificates of merit."
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code § 150.002 requires that, in
any case "arising out of the provision of professional services by a li-
censed or registered professional," the plaintiff must-contemporane-
ously with filing the original petition-file a sworn certificate of merit
from a similarly licensed or registered professional attesting to any pro-
fessional errors or omissions forming the basis of such claims.98 If the
92. Id.
93. Id. at 234.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 494. But see Mokkala v. Mead, 178 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (noting that "[tihe plaintiff controls when she files a petition alleg-
ing a health care liability claim, thereby triggering the commencement of the 120-period
within which she must serve the expert report. Subject only to the statute of limitations, a
plaintiff can therefore wait to file a petition until she has obtained, and can serve, the
expert report.").
96. CHCA Woman's Hosp., 369 S.W.3d at 495.
97. Id. at 496.
98. TEX. CIV. PROC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(a) (West 2011).
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plaintiff does not file a certificate of merit, the court must dismiss the
complaint, and the dismissal "may be with prejudice." 99 With the 2009
amendments to the statute, it is now clear that a certificate of merit is
required for any theory of recovery based on alleged professional errors
and omissions, not just negligence actions.'00 Courts have differed, how-
ever, regarding whether the certificate of merit must address the elements
of each pleaded cause of action or whether it must merely address the
professional errors and omissions that form the basis of each cause of
action.Wi
The appellate courts also have been inconsistent in the standard by
which they judge the sufficiency of the experts' affidavits. In Durivage v.
La Alhambra Condominium Ass'n, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
held that nothing in § 150.002 requires that the expert's statements not be
conclusory or even comply with rules of evidence.102 It also noted that
the requirement in § 150.002 to show a "factual basis" for the expert's
opinion is "less onerous" than the expert report requirement for health
care liability claims, which requires among other things a description of
"the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care
provider failed to meet the standards [of care]."103 But that same court
later seemed to apply a higher standard when it reversed the denial of a
motion to dismiss in Garza v. Carmona, holding that a certificate of merit
alleging negligence must "specifically identif[y] the actions, errors, and/or
omissions that in the affiant's opinion deviated from the applicable stan-
dard of care and caused the harm for which the plaintiff seeks dam-
ages."104 And, in contrast to that opinion, the court in CBM Engineers,
Inc. v. Tellepsen Builders, LP held that a certificate of merit "need not
recite the applicable standard of care and how it was allegedly
violated."105
Disputes also still exist with regard to the ability of a trial court, for
"good cause," to grant an extension of time to file the certificate of merit.
The First District Court of Appeals in Houston considered but did not
resolve this issue in Pro Plus, Inc. v. Crosstex Energy Services, LP.106 Sec-
tion 150.002(c) provides that if the statute of limitations will expire within
ten days of the filing of the petition and the plaintiff cannot obtain a
certificate of merit before filing, the plaintiff can have an additional thirty
99. Id. § 150.002(e).
100. Id. § 150.002(b).
101. Compare Durivage v. La Alhambra Condo. Ass'n, No. 13-11-00324-CV, 2011 Tex.
App. LEXIS 10030, at *9-12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 21, 2011, pet. dism'd) (mem.
op.), with M-E Eng'rs, Inc. v. City of Temple, 365 S.W.3d 497, 505-06 (Tex. App.-Austin
2012, pet. denied).
102. Durivage, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10030, at *8-9.
103. Id. at *8-9 (quoting TEX. Civ. Pluc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(r)(6) (West
2011)).
104. Garza v. Carmona, 390 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.).
105. CBM Eng'rs, Inc. v. Tellepsen Builders, LP, No. 01-11-01033-CV, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 177, at *15 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 10, 2013, pet. denied).
106. Pro Plus, Inc. v. Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P., 388 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. granted).
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days to supplement the petition and file the certificate. 07 That subsection
then goes on: "The trial court may, on motion, after hearing and for good
cause, extend such time as it shall determine justice requires."108 The
plaintiff in this case, Crosstex, had not filed a certificate of merit with its
petition, but argued that the trial court had discretion to grant an exten-
sion under subsection (c). Crosstex acknowledged that the first part of
subsection (c) did not apply because the statute of limitations did not run
on its claims within ten days of the filing of its petition. But it argued that
the last sentence, granting the trial court discretion to permit additional
time, is a "stand-alone provision."1 09 Crosstex relied on WCM Group,
Inc. v. Brown,10 in which the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held just
that and "refused to limit the application of 'the good cause exception' to
circumstances in which the plaintiff files suit within ten days of the expi-
ration of the statute of limitations.""' The Houston Court of Appeals
found it did not need to decide whether it agreed with the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals because it found that Crosstex had not established
"good cause" in any event.112 Crosstex argued that Pro Plus participated
in the litigation and agreed to the extension of various deadlines, includ-
ing the expert designation deadline, but the court held that such conduct
occurred after the filing of the petition and so could not excuse Crosstex's
failure to file a certificate of merit with the petition."13 It therefore held
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Pro Plus's motion to
dismiss.114
With the current uncertainty with regard to the level of scrutiny that
will be applied to certificates of merit, the availability of a "good cause"
extension, and the drastic consequences of not timely filing an adequate
report, plaintiffs would be well advised to provide as detailed a report as
possible as early as possible in order to make sure they comply with the
statute.
V. CLAIMS AGAINST OWNERS, OFFICERS, AND DIRECTORS
A. IDENTITY CRISIS-PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Courts of appeals were split on individual liability of officers and direc-
tors through attempts to pierce the corporate veil during this Survey pe-
riod. The Texarkana Court of Appeals thoroughly addressed the issue in
Endsley Electric, Inc. v. Altech, Inc.x15 In that case, Altech, a general con-
107. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE Ar. § 150.002(c) (West 2011).
108. Id.
109. Pro Plus, 388 S.W.3d at 700.
110. WCM Group, Inc. v. Brown, 305 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, pet.
dism'd).
111. Pro Plus, 388 S.W.3d at 700.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 700-01.
114. Id. at 702-03.




tractor, sued its electrical subcontractor and the subcontractor's corpo-
rate officers alleging breach of contract after the subcontractor failed to
complete its work. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of
Altech, holding the company and the officers jointly and severally
liable.116
The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed judgment as to the officers
finding legally insufficient evidence to support individual liability." 7 The
court first found that there was no individual liability for breach of con-
tract or negligence because the contract was signed by the President in
her capacity as a corporate officer and neither individual owed a separate
duty to the plaintiff.118 Addressing the circumstances under which the
corporate veil can be pierced, the court noted that a more stringent statu-
tory standard exists in order to prove that a shareholder is personally
responsible for contractual obligations of the corporation. That standard
requires a showing that the shareholder "caused the corporation to be
used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud
on the [plaintiff] primarily for the direct personal benefit of the [share-
holder]."119 Because there was no evidence that the individuals provided
personal funds, represented they were personally backing the project
with the company, commingled personal and company funds, made loans
to or from the company, prioritized themselves as creditors, or otherwise
abused the corporate form, the court found that the corporate veil should
not be pierced.120
The court also addressed the consequences of forfeiture of the corpo-
rate charter, which had occurred after the lawsuit was filed, holding that
where there is no evidence that the liability was created or incurred after
the forfeiture, corporate forfeiture does not support personal liability.121
The Austin Court of Appeals applied the same principles of piercing
the corporate veil to limited liability companies in Shook v. Walden.122 In
Shook the trial court rendered judgments against a homebuilder company
and its managers jointly and severally after the buyers brought a breach
of construction contract claim against them. On appeal the principal issue
was the power of courts to disregard the separate existence of a Texas
limited liability company under the equitable veil piercing principles that
have evolved in Texas in regard to business corporations. Of course, as of
April 20, 2011, the Texas Legislature has addressed this specific issue
through amendments to the Business Organizations Code and has specifi-
cally extended the statutory standards governing veil piercing of corpora-
tions to LLCs.123 This case, however, was governed by prior law. Under
116. Id. at 19-20.
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 22.
119. Id. at 23 (citing TEX. Bus. ORGS, CODE ANN. § 21.223(b) (West 2012)).
120. Id. at 25.
121. Id. at 25-26.
122. Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Austin 2012, pet. denied).
123. TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.002 (West 2012).
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that prior law, the Austin Court of Appeals held that courts must resolve
the question the same way the legislature ultimately did.124 That is, the
same principles applied-the veil of an LLC may be pierced with respect
to the entity's contractual liabilities only upon proof that the defendant
used the LLC to perpetrate actual fraud for the defendant's direct per-
sonal benefit.125 Because there was no proof that the individuals used the
LLC to perpetrate actual fraud for their direct and personal benefit, the
court of appeals held that the trial court erred in imposing individual
liability.126
In Tryco Enterprises, Inc. v. Robinson, the First District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston addressed the corporate veil issue in connection with
forfeiture of the corporate charter.127 In that case Robinson, a former
employee, sued Tryco in a Fair Labor Standards Act suit alleging that the
company failed to pay him for overtime. The employee prevailed, but
before the judgment was signed, Tryco forfeited its corporate privileges
for failure to pay franchise tax. A year later, Robinson sued the individ-
ual officers of Tryco to enforce the judgment, alleging forfeiture of corpo-
rate charter and fraudulent transfer of assets. Specifically, Robinson
alleged that, prior to Tryco forfeiting its corporate charter, its officers
transferred employees and assets to a new company for which they also
served as officers, effectively leaving Tryco as an empty shell.128 Robin-
son asserted an alter-ego theory of liability alleging either that the of-
ficers and the new company, Crown Staffing, were a mere tool, a business
conduit of the individuals, or that the companies operated as a single bus-
iness enterprise with the individuals acting as the true owners/managers.
Ultimately, the court found the individual officers failed to pay corporate
franchise taxes, forfeited the corporate charter, and on the same day the
verdict was returned but before judgment was entered transferred the
corporate assets to the new company, Crown Staffing, for which they
were also officers.129 Crown Staffing took over the offices of Tryco at the
same location, used the same phone numbers, the same employees, per-
formed the same staffing services, and was managed by the same manag-
ers. There was also evidence that the individuals exercised absolute
control and ownership over both companies, maintained a significant per-
sonal financial interest in both companies, and used them for their per-
sonal purposes. The court of appeals therefore found that both companies
were alter egos of the individuals and part of a single business enterprise
under the former Business Corporations Act Article 2.21 and current
124. Shook, 368 S.W.3d at 607.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 622. This case provides perhaps the most expansive historical look at piercing
the corporate veil under Texas law and would be a useful read for anyone seeking to un-
derstand this issue.
127. Tryco Enters, Inc. v. Robinson, 390 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. dism'd).
128. Id. at 502.
129. Id. at 510-11.
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Business Organizations Code § 21.223.130 Because the individuals had
used the corporate fiction to perpetuate a fraud, specifically transferring
assets and forfeiting the company's charter to avoid the company's legal
obligations, both individuals were found personally liable to the
plaintiff.131
The federal courts weighed in on this issue in Flores v. Bodden, ruling
that Bodden, the owner of a shrimp trawler company, was its alter ego
and was liable for a judgment obtained after it filed for bankruptcy.132 In
that case, a former employee obtained a default judgment for his on-the-
job injuries after the owner attempted to avoid service of process and
then failed to answer. Before a final judgment could be entered, the com-
pany filed for bankruptcy. After the company's trustee agreed to a final
judgment during the bankruptcy proceedings, the individual plaintiff filed
suit against Bodden in his personal capacity, alleging that Bodden was the
alter ego of the company. The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas agreed, finding that because the owner exercised
complete control over the company, he was the corporation's alter ego
and was liable individually for the plaintiff's injuries. 133 On appeal, the
owner incorrectly asserted that Texas law requires a finding of complete
control over operations and use of that control to commit a fraud or
wrong. Noting that the alter-ego inquiry is meant to be flexible and that
Texas courts are generally less reluctant to disregard the corporate entity
in tort cases than in breach of contract cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the district court finding that the individual defendant
used the corporation to unfairly and inequitably shield himself from risks
he knew would arise in running a shrimping business. 134 The court specifi-
cally focused on attempts to evade service, the undercapitalization of the
company relative to the risk it faced, the degree of control exercised by
the officer, the lack of insurance, and commingling of corporate funds
with other sources of income. 35
As demonstrated by the cases discussed above, the courts in this Sur-
vey period have respected the corporate form when the owners have
respected the corporate formalities, but they have not hesitated to pierce
the corporate veil when necessary to avoid a fraud.
B. You CAN RUN BUT You CAN'T HIDE-PERSONAL JURISDICTION
During the Survey period, Texas courts addressed two unusual asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state officers and directors.
In ACS Partners, LLC v. Gross, the First District Court of Appeals in
Houston declined to find that § 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code creates a
130. Id. at 510.
131. Id. at 511.
132. Flores v. Bodden, 488 F. App'x 770, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2012).
133. Id. at 772.




basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident officer or di-
rector. 136 The plaintiff in that case brought suit against an LLC's manag-
ing member (Gross), alleging it was not paid under certain contracts.
Gross filed a special appearance, which the trial court granted. 3 7 The
plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the plaintiff relied solely on a novel alter-ego theory, at-
tempting to establish jurisdiction not by piercing the corporate veil but by
applying § 171.255(a) of the Texas Tax Code.138 As addressed earlier,
§ 171.255(a) imposes liability on directors and officers for debts that a
corporation creates after the corporation's corporate privileges are for-
feited for failing to file reports or pay franchise taxes.139 The court re-
jected the plaintiff's attempt to establish jurisdiction through corporate
forfeiture, stating that the plain language of § 171.255(a) only provides a
basis to impose liability on directors and officers, not to assert jurisdic-
tion.140 It therefore affirmed the trial court's dismissal.141
In Shahin v. Deyaar Development Corp. USA, the First District Court
of Appeals in Houston determined that exercising personal jurisdiction
over a defendant with substantial contacts in Texas, but imprisoned
abroad in Dubai, did not violate due process or notions of fair play or
substantial justice.142 In that case, the plaintiff brought a fraud claim for
misrepresentations related to a real estate transaction.143 The defendant,
an officer and director of the Texas corporation that purchased the real
estate at issue, solicited and negotiated the Texas real estate deal and
traveled to Texas repeatedly over the course of the transaction.144 The
defendant argued that exercising jurisdiction over him did not comport
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because he was
imprisoned in Dubai. The court focused on the burden on the defendant
to defend himself, which the defendant claimed "border[ed] on impossi-
bility" because he claimed he lacked access to counsel and was concerned
conversations with counsel might be monitored or used against him in
Dubai.14s Noting that civil litigants do not have an absolute right to coun-
sel, there was no evidence conversations were being monitored, the de-
fendant had access to at least one Dubai attorney who was representing
him there, and he successfully obtained Texas counsel to represent him in
the special appearance, the court determined it was possible for him to
obtain access to counsel. 146 The court also noted that while he might not
136. ACS Partners, LLC v. Gross, No. 01-11-00245-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3697, at
*12 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 4, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
137. Id. at *2.
138. Id. at *8-10.
139. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (West 2008).
140. ACS Partners, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3697, at *12-13.
141. Id. at *13.
142. Shahin v. Deyaar Dev. Corp. USA, 367 S.W.3d 274,288 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st.
Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
143. Id. at 283.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 285.
146. Id. at 285-86.
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have access to modern technology to facilitate his defense, any counsel in
Dubai retained by him would.147 Collectively, this persuaded the court to
affirm the trial court's special appearance denial, holding that his impris-
onment was not too great a burden and did not represent the rare case
where exercising jurisdiction would not comport with traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. 148
C. SOMETHING FOR OUR TRANSACTIONAL FRIENDS
In Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, LLC, the First District Court of
Appeals in Houston provided guidance to transactional attorneys draft-
ing disclaimers of reliance and advising redemptions between insider
LLC managers and interest holders.149 The case establishes how clear and
unequivocal a disclaimer must be to constitute a general disclaimer of
reliance. It also shows that to enforce the clause, the parties must either
negotiate its terms or the transaction must be an arms-length transaction,
even when the clause is clear and unequivocal and both parties are so-
phisticated and represented by counsel. The court also imposed a formal
fiduciary duty on LLC member-managers engaging in stock redemptions
with other non-manager members.
The plaintiff in this case had purchased an 8% interest in an LLC
(Chief) in the oil and gas industry. 50 After receiving a redemption offer
letter from the sole managing member, Rees-Jones, that included details
on the value of the company and its current and planned ventures, the
plaintiff decided to redeem his interest. The closing was delayed eight
months from the time of the letter, during which time technological ad-
vances in horizontal drilling and new leases acquired by Chief rendered
some statements in the letter false or misleading. Chief did not update
statements in the letter and did not change the redemption offer. The
plaintiff was aware of some of these changes but claimed Rees-Jones told
him that updating the valuations in the letter was not necessary. Approxi-
mately twenty-four months after the redemption, Chief's management
sold Chief for approximately twenty times the valuation used in the
redemption.' 5 '
The plaintiff sued Chief and Rees-Jones for violations of the Texas Se-
curities Act (TSA), common law and statutory fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, and shareholder oppression.15 2 The trial court granted summary
judgment on all claims in favor of the defendants, and plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals reversed summary judgment on the fraud, breach of
147. Id. at 286.
148. Id. at 288.
149. Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, LLC, 367 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012), pet. granted and judgment vacated by agr., 2013 Tex. LEXIS 20 (Tex. Jan. 11,
2013).
150. Id. at 366.
151. Id. at 367.
152. Id. at 365.
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fiduciary duty, and TSA claims.153
With regard to the plaintiff's fraud claims, the court considered
whether the plaintiff could demonstrate reliance. It noted: "parties to an
agreement can prevent a future claim that the agreement was fraudu-
lently induced by including contract language clearly and unequivocally
disclaiming reliance." 154 Central to the court's analysis of the alleged con-
tractual waiver of reliance was an "independent investigation" clause in
the redemption agreement, which stated the plaintiff had based his deci-
sion to redeem "on (1) his own independent due diligence investigation,
(2) his own expertise and judgment, and (3) the advice and counsel of his
own advisors and consultants." 55 Both defendants argued this clause was
a general disclaimer of reliance that prevented plaintiff from relying on
any representations by Rees-Jones or Chief.
The court reasoned that because the clause did not state that the plain-
tiff relied exclusively on his own due diligence investigation and expertise
and judgment, the clause did not clearly and unequivocally "negate the
possibility that [the plaintiff's] decision was also based on information
provided by" defendants.' 5 6 The court noted that the clause lacked (1)
all-embracing language that disclaimed any reliance, (2) a specific no-lia-
bility clause stating that defendants would not be liable for plaintiff's use
of provided information, and (3) any specific waiver of fraudulent induce-
ment claims.' 57 Ultimately, the court found that, although the clause did
not disclaim all reliance, it was clear the clause intended to disclaim some
reliance.' 58 Specifically, the clause intended to disclaim reliance on repre-
sentations about Chief's valuation in the redemption letter, the bases for
that valuation, and whether the valuation and its bases accurately re-
flected Chief's value or assets.159 Thus, the Court held that the clause
disclaimed reliance only as to statements about those specific issues.160
The court concluded, however, that although the clause clearly and un-
equivocally intended to disclaim some reliance, it was nonetheless unen-
forceable because the totality of circumstances surrounding the
redemption did not satisfy either the arm's-length transaction or negoti-
ated terms factors spelled out by the Texas Supreme Court in Forest Oil
v. McAllen.161
153. Id. at 412.
154. Id. at 376.
155. Id. at 376-77.
156. Id. at 379.
157. Id. at 380.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 382.
161. Id. at 385-86. The opinion contains a thorough analysis of enforceability applying
the four extrinsic factors from Forest Oil v. McAllen-whether "(1) the terms of the con-
tract were negotiated, rather than boilerplate . . . ; (2) the complaining party was repre-
sented by counsel; (3) the parties dealt with each other in an arm's length transaction;
[and] (4) the parties were knowledgeable in business matters .... Forest Oil v. McAllen,
268 S.W.3d 51, 60 (Tex. 2008). Even though it held that the disclaimer was unenforceable,
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One additional notable issue from this case was the court's recognition
of a formal fiduciary duty between an LLC's majority owner and sole
member-manager and minority interest holders in the limited context of a
redemption. 1 6 2 The court first joined other Texas courts in holding that no
general fiduciary duty exists between majority and minority shareholders
in a closely held corporation.163 But the court found a fiduciary duty here
reasoning that because LLCs incorporate aspects of partnerships and cor-
porations and the majority owner and sole manager of an LLC exercises
similar control and authority to a general partner in a limited partnership,
a formal fiduciary duty exists.164 The court also reasoned that, under a
"special facts" analysis,165 the type of transaction here, an LLC interest
redemption, justified imposing a formal fiduciary duty.166 The court
noted that imposing a formal fiduciary duty rather than letting a jury de-
termine whether an informal fiduciary duty exists provides "the certainty
and predictability needed for companies to manage prudently their af-
fairs." 167 The court therefore concluded that because Rees-Jones did not
conclusively show that he did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment.168
D. GREAT EXPECTATIONs-DALLAS COURT OF APPEALS DEFINES
"EXPECTATIONS" TEST FOR SHAREHOLDER
OPPRESSION CLAIMS
During the Survey period, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered
three shareholder oppression cases and moved the focus of such claims
from whether a majority shareholder's conduct was "burdensome, harsh,
and wrongful" to whether the minority shareholder's objectively reasona-
ble expectations were defeated.169 In Ritchie v. Rupe, the court defined
shareholder oppression as "conduct that substantially defeats the minor-
the court still found that the plaintiff could not have justifiably relied on certain statements
because he had knowledge as to the change in Chief's value. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 387-88.
162. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 389.
163. Id. at 391.
164. Id. at 391-93.
165. Noting that courts differ in their approach to determining when a corporate direc-
tor or officer has a fiduciary duty to shareholders, the court adopted the special facts ap-
proach to determine when a sole manager and majority owner of an LLC owes a duty to
other members. Id. at 393-94. The court held that because of the confidential nature of the
relationship and the access to inside information by the member manager, special facts
exist to justify imposing a fiduciary duty in a redemption between a member-manager and
a minority member. Id. at 393-95.
166. Id. at 393-96.
167. Id. at 394.
168. Id. at 398.
169. The Texas Supreme Court has not yet recognized a claim for shareholder oppres-
sion or defined its elements. In the absence of such direction, the Texas appellate courts
have looked to various definitions from other states, including essentially (1) whether the
majority's conduct defeated the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations and (2)
whether the majority's conduct was "burdensome, harsh, or wrongful" or a "violation of
fair play." See, e.g., Willis v. Bydalek, 997 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, pet. denied). For a thorough discussion of the history of shareholder oppression in
Texas, see Kelli Hinson et al., Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? The Struggle to Craft
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ity's expectations that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable under
the circumstances and central to the minority shareholder's decision to
join the venture."1 70 The court distinguished between general and specific
reasonable expectations. General reasonable expectations are those held
by all shareholders by virtue of stock ownership, including "the right to
proportionate participation in earnings, the right to any stock apprecia-
tion, the right (with a proper purpose) to inspect corporate records, [ ] the
right to vote if the stock has voting rights," and the right to sell the stock
to another person "at a mutually acceptable price."171 In contrast, the
court defined "specific reasonable expectations" as "those specifically
agreed to or expected as part of the transactions forming a particular cor-
poration or that may develop over time among shareholders of a particu-
lar corporation." 17 2
After reviewing the shareholders' general and specific expectations, the
court of appeals held that the Rupe Investment Corporation (RIC) and
its controlling shareholders "acted oppressively toward Ann [a minority
shareholder] by refusing to meet . . . with prospective purchasers of the
Stock because that conduct . . . substantially defeated Ann's general rea-
sonable expectation of marketing the Stock."173 The court upheld the
trial court's equitable remedy of a buy-out, but rejected the ordered buy-
out price, which did not include any discount for lack of marketability or
minority status.174 The court reasoned that the minority shareholder's ex-
pectation was to be able to sell her shares at fair market value, including
minority discounts, and that the remedy for oppression should not put
her in any better position.175 Ritchie is now on appeal to the Texas Su-
preme Court. The supreme court's decision should provide some much
needed guidance with regard to this relatively new and unsettled area of
the law.
Meanwhile, the Dallas Court of Appeals confirmed its belief that a rea-
sonable expectations analysis is the proper method of determining share-
holder oppression in ARGO Data Resource Corp. v. Shagrithaya.176 Max
Martin and Balkrishna Shagrithaya founded ARGO Data Resource Cor-
poration (ARGO) in 1980 and held 53% and 47% of the company's
stock, respectively. After many years of building a very profitable busi-
Remedies in Shareholder Oppression Cases, Presented at Texas Bar CLE: Damages in
Civil Litigation Course (Mar. 7-8, 2013).
170. Ritchie v. Rupe, 339 S.W.3d 275, 290 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. granted)
(quoting Willis, 997 S.W.2d at 801).
171. Id. at 292.
172. Id. at 291. The Ritchie court does not attempt to reconcile its loose language that
specific expectations may "develop over time" with the long-accepted concept that, to be
relevant, a shareholder's expectations must have existed at the time she "decided to join
the venture." Id.
173. Id. at 296.
174. Id. at 301.
175. Id.
176. ARGO Data Resource Corp. v. Shagrithaya, 380 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2012, pet. filed). Carrington Coleman, including the author Kelli Hinson, served as trial
and appellate counsel for the shareholder Max Martin.
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ness, disputes arose between the two shareholders regarding, among
other things, Martin's decision to reduce Shagrithaya's compensation
from $1 million to $300,000 per year, Martin's refusal to support the enor-
mous dividends that Shagrithaya believed were warranted, and Martin's
offer to have ARGO purchase Shagrithaya's shares for their fair market
value of $66 million, which Shagrithaya believed unfairly included dis-
counts for his minority status. After a six-week trial, the jury found that
Martin had committed eleven specific wrongful acts. The trial court held
that Martin's conduct was oppressive and, among other things, ordered
ARGO to issue an $85 million dividend as an equitable remedy.177
On appeal, the court reversed and rendered judgment, ordering
Shagrithaya to take nothing.178 The court held that the jury's factual find-
ings were supported by sufficient evidence. But, reiterating and applying
the standards adopted in Ritchie, it meticulously addressed each allegedly
oppressive act found by the jury and held as a matter of law that the
enumerated acts were not "oppressive" because they did not defeat
Shagrithaya's general or specific reasonable expectations. 1 7 9 This case is
also currently on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.
The Dallas Court of Appeals' third published opinion on shareholder
oppression was Cardiac Perfusion Services v. Hughes.80 Michael Joubran
formed Cardiac Perfusion Services (CPS) in 1991 and hired Randall
Hughes as his first employee. 181 Hughes became a 10% owner of CPS
and entered into a Buy-Sell Agreement that restricted the sale or transfer
of CPS shares and required Joubran and CPS to purchase Hughes's stock
upon termination of his employment with CPS at a specified "book
value." Several years later, a dispute arose between the parties, and
Hughes's employment was terminated. Joubran then sued Hughes seek-
ing, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the Buy-Sell Agree-
ment governed Joubran's obligation to purchase Hughes's stock. Hughes
countersued for shareholder oppression and other claims.
[T]he jury found that Joubran (1) suppressed payment of profit dis-
tributions to Hughes, (2) paid himself excessive compensation using
CPS's corporate funds, (3) improperly paid his family members using
CPS funds, (4) used CPS funds to pay his personal expenses, (5) used
his control of CPS to lower the value of Hughes's stock, and (6) re-
fused to let Hughes examine CPS's books and records. 182
Hughes did not assert, and the trial court did not find, that his termina-
tion was oppressive conduct. The trial court concluded, based on the
jury's findings, that Joubran engaged in shareholder oppression and re-
quired Joubran and CPS to redeem Hughes's shares at what the jury
177. Id. at 263-64.
178. Id. at 257.
179. Id. at 263-72.
180. Cardiac Perfusion Servs. v. Hughes, 380 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, pet.
filed). Carrington Coleman represents Michael Joubran on appeal.




found to be fair value, $300,000, rather than the contractually agreed-to
book value of $77,764.183
On appeal, the court considered whether the trial court erred in using
the fair value (without discounts for minority status or lack of marketabil-
ity) rather than the book value defined by the Buy-Sell Agreement. 184 It
quoted dicta in Ritchie, which did not involve a shareholders' agreement
or buy-sell agreement: "Enterprise value [without discounts] has been
seen as the appropriate valuation when a minority shareholder . . . has
been forced to relinquish his ownership position by the oppressive con-
duct of the majority." 85 Although purporting to rely on this language
from Ritchie, the court did not address whether Hughes had in fact been
forced out by the oppressive conduct of the majority. As noted above, the
termination of Hughes's employment, which triggered the Buy-Sell
Agreement, was not oppressive. Nevertheless, the court held the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by using fair value, rejecting CPS and
Joubran's authority stating that Texas does not allow parties to recover
through equity that to which they are contractually not entitled. 186 The
court reasoned that those authorities did not "involve a trial court's exer-
cise of its equitable discretion in the context of a claim for shareholder
oppression."1 87 Stated another way, the court held that shareholder op-
pression nullified the Buy-Sell Agreement. As a result, the court's rem-
edy did not meet the minority's expectations, it ignored them, and the
majority received a buy-out at a value much higher than his Buy-Sell
Agreement allowed.188 Evidencing its interest in shareholder oppression,
the Texas Supreme Court is also reviewing this case.
VI. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the cases discussed in this article, important issues
impacting professional liability claims-whether against lawyers, health-
care professionals, architects and engineers, or corporate owners, officers,
and directors-have been impacted by recent rulings from the Texas Su-
preme Court and will likely be further impacted by upcoming decisions.
183. Id. at 202.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 204 (quoting Ritchie v. Rupe, 339 S.W.3d 275, 300-01 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2011, pet. granted)).
186. Id. at 205.
187. Id. at 204.
188. One other appellate court notably addressed shareholder oppression post-Ritchie:
Feldman v. Kim, No. 14-11-00184-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3155 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Apr. 24, 2012, no pet.). In Feldman, the Fourteenth District in Houston re-
versed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of majority shareholder defend-
ants and their partnership on a shareholder oppression claim. The court found that the
majority allocated revenue disproportionately in its favor while allocating expenses pro-
portionately. Id. at *11-12. The majority's actions placed the minority "in the position of
subsidizing the returns for his associates while receiving none for himself"-a fact that
"taken alone, is sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Id. at *12. The result mirrors
Ritchie's statement that a shareholder has a general expectation of "the right to propor-
tionate participation in earnings." Ritchie, 339 S.W.3d at 292.
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As in past years, however, it remains clear that professional liability
claims each have their own unique procedural and proof requirements.
The appellate courts in this period required strict compliance with these
requirements, holding both plaintiffs and defendants accountable when
their pleadings or proof fell short.
